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WITHOUT REPRESENTATION, NO TAXATION:
FREE BLACKS, TAXES, AND TAX EXEMPTIONS
BETWEEN THE REVOLUTIONARY AND CIVIL WARS
Christopher J. Bryant*
This Essay is the first general survey of the taxation of free Blacks in free
and slave states between the Revolutionary and Civil Wars. A few states treated
all equally for tax purposes, but most states enacted taxation systems that subjected
free Blacks to different requirements. Both free and slave states viewed free Blacks
as an undesirable population, and this Essay posits that—within the relevant political constraints—states used taxes and tax exemptions to dissuade free Black
immigration and limit the opportunities for free Blacks within their borders.
This topic is salient for at least two reasons. First, the Essay sheds light on
laws and events that the literature—and the American educational system—has
largely ignored. It directly contradicts the commonly held belief that free Blacks
largely enjoyed the same set of rights and privileges as their White counterparts
until Jim Crow and the Black Codes set in after the Civil War. Second, by
juxtaposing then-widely prevailing views with historical tax laws, this Essay underscores the inherent relationship between tax policy and social policy. Taxes have
never been just about bolstering the public fisc. Although this Essay will hopefully
never have direct applicability to contemporary events, it can provide insight into
current and future tax policies and the extent to which history, prejudice, and
economic concerns inform policymakers’ decisions.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. “A GRIEVOUS AFFLICTION”: FREE BLACKS THROUGH
THE EYES OF THE JUDICIARY AND LEGISLATURE . . . . . . . .
II. THE TAXATION OF FREE BLACKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Taxing Freedom: Slave States’ Taxation of Free Blacks . . . .
B. Separate But (Mostly) Equal: Free States’ Taxation of Free
Blacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III. REVOLUTIONARY ROOTS: BLACK TAX OBJECTORS . . . . .
IV. UNDERSTANDING THE STATES’ VARYING TAXATION
SCHEMES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Taxing Free Blacks to Protect Slave Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. A Delicate Balancing Act: The Varying Taxation of Free
Blacks in Free States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

92
93
98
99
104
107
110
110
112

*
Duke University School of Law, J.D., 2014; Duke University, A.B. in economics,
2008. Many thanks to Professor Paul Finkelman for introducing me to the subject matter, Judge
James A. Wynn, Jr. and Jessica Newman for encouraging me to publish this Essay, and the editors
of the Michigan Journal of Race & Law for their diligent efforts and excellent suggestions.

91

92

Michigan Journal of Race & Law

[VOL. 21:91

C. Understanding the Free Black Tax Exemptions . . . . . . . . . .
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. POPULATION DATA FROM THE 1790 CENSUS . . . . . . . . . . .
II. POPULATION DATA FROM THE 1800 CENSUS . . . . . . . . . . .
III. POPULATION DATA FROM THE 1810 CENSUS . . . . . . . . . . .
IV. POPULATION DATA FROM THE 1820 CENSUS . . . . . . . . . . .
V. POPULATION DATA FROM THE 1830 CENSUS . . . . . . . . . . .
VI. POPULATION DATA FROM THE 1840 CENSUS . . . . . . . . . . .
VII. POPULATION DATA FROM THE 1850 CENSUS . . . . . . . . . . .
VIII. POPULATION DATA FROM THE 1860 CENSUS . . . . . . . . . . .

112
114
115
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122

INTRODUCTION
Around 1860, the town of Norwich, Connecticut, seized assets from
R.I. Stoddard’s estate to recover taxes he failed to pay before he died.1
Charles Johnson, the executor of Stoddard’s estate, sued the town to recover the amount it seized.2 The Connecticut Supreme Court ruled in
Johnson’s favor without determining whether Stoddard paid the taxes.3
How did the court reach its decision?
The decisive factor was Stoddard’s race. Because Stoddard was a
quadroon,4 his estate was exempt from taxation.5 Connecticut’s General
Assembly exempted “[t]he personal and real estate of persons of color”
from taxation6 because Connecticut’s constitution denied them the right
to vote.7
Connecticut and Rhode Island were the only states to exempt free
Blacks’8 personal and real property from all taxation.9 A few states treated
all equally for tax purposes, but most states enacted taxation systems that
subjected free Blacks to different requirements. This Essay is the first gen1.
Johnson v. Town of Norwich, 29 Conn. 407, 407 (1860).
2.
Id.
3.
Id. at 408.
4.
Id. at 407 (“A quadroon, or person having one-fourth negro blood, is a person of
color . . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
5.
Id. at 407–08.
6.
1844 Conn. Pub. Acts 36–37.
7.
Johnson, 29 Conn. at 409 (referencing CONN. CONST. art. VI, § 2, which limited the
franchise to White males meeting certain qualifications).
8.
As a quick aside, this Essay intentionally uses the term “free Blacks” instead of “African Americans” due to the realities of the time period. As the infamous Dred Scott v. Sanford
decision declared, free persons of African origin were not citizens “and had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power and the Government might choose to grant them.”
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 405 (1856), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV.
9.
See infra text accompanying note 92. See generally infra Part II for examples of states
that exempted free Blacks from paying taxes used for particular purposes, like voting and schools.
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eral survey of the taxation of free Blacks in the free and slave states between
the Revolutionary and Civil Wars.10
This Essay’s primary purpose is to shed some light on laws and events
that the literature and the American educational system have largely ignored. Many Americans have grown up with misconceptions about the
lives of free Blacks during this time period. Some have been taught that
Blacks who were not slaves largely enjoyed the same set of rights and privileges as their White counterparts until Jim Crow and the Black Codes set
in after the Civil War. Others believe free Blacks suffered de jure injustices
only in the southern slave states that constituted the Confederacy. Both of
these beliefs are incorrect.
To provide context for the discussion of the taxation of free Blacks,
Part I briefly reviews the then-prevalent public perception of free Blacks
through the lens of judicial opinions and legislative acts. Part II then
surveys the taxation of free Blacks in the slave and free states. Part III introduces the “no taxation without representation” conscientious tax objections free Blacks made in a handful of free states. Finally, Part IV offers
hypotheses for why the taxation of free Blacks varied from state to state.
I. “A GRIEVOUS AFFLICTION”: FREE BLACKS THROUGH
OF THE JUDICIARY AND LEGISLATURE

THE

EYES

According to judicial opinions and legislative acts in the period between the Revolutionary and Civil Wars, “free negrodom”11 was a twofold “grievous affliction.”12 Free Blacks ostensibly presented a danger to
the institution of slavery because they would entice slaves to run away and
revolt. Jurists and legislators also characterized free Blacks as a class unworthy of envy, lazy and incapable of self-care, destined to live in a state of
squalor and degeneracy far below the station of the slave, and fated to
create a burden on society as a whole.
On the heels of the Revolutionary War, lawyers openly stated that
free Blacks were immoral and posed a danger to societal and economic
interests.13 Similar language appeared in the body of judicial opinions in
the early 1800s, but these opinions merely quoted or paraphrased prefatory
10.
For a highly informative and interesting survey of the tax treatment of slaves before
the Civil War, see George Ruble Woolfolk, Taxes and Slavery in the Ante Bellum South, 26 J. S.
HIST. 180 (1960). Woolfolk’s article briefly discusses tax provisions from a few slave states regarding free Blacks, but makes no mention of the taxation of free Blacks in free states.
11.

Curry v. Curry, 30 Ga. 253, 259 (1860).

12.

Fisher’s Negroes v. Dabbs, 14 Tenn. (6 Yer.) 119, 130 (1834).

13.
See, e.g., Collins v. Hall, 1 Del. Cas. 652, 655 (1793) (argument of Read, Bayard, and
Miller, attorneys for the defendant) (“[I]t is well known that Negroes are generally uninformed
as to the principles of morality and religion, . . . without regard to which our persons, property
or lives cannot be in a state of security.”).
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wording of legislative enactments.14 In 1834, John Catron, who sat on the
Tennessee Supreme Court from 1824 to 1834 and the United States Supreme Court from 1837 to 1865, provided the judiciary’s first full-throated
endorsement of this position.
Justice Catron wrote the opinion in Fisher’s Negroes v. Dabbs,15 a case
concerning the manumission of several slaves through a will. Peter Fisher’s
will (1) called for his slaves to be set free; (2) left them livestock, farming
equipment, and a year’s worth of financial support; and (3) granted them
the right to live on his plantation for 15 years following his death.16 He left
the remainder of his estate to his nieces and nephews.17 James Dabbs, the
appointed administrator of Fisher’s estate, refused to petition the county
court for the slaves’ freedom because he did not want to pay the bond the
state required to safeguard against the fear that manumitted slaves would
become wards of the state.18 The slaves sued for their freedom in chancery
court, stating, “through their counsel, that they were willing to accept
their freedom upon any terms the court thought proper to impose.”19
Fisher’s slaves agreed to immigrate to Liberia in exchange for their freedom, and the chancery court emancipated one of the slaves.20 Dabbs and
one of Fisher’s nephews, who had purchased the entirety of the estate’s
inheritance interests from his relatives, appealed the decision.21
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Catron went further than affirming the chancery court’s decision; he emancipated all of Fisher’s
slaves.22 Justice Catron buttressed the court’s position that the only appropriate terms of manumission included “immediate removal beyond, not
only [Tennessee], but beyond the limits of the United States of
America,”23 with rhetoric that would reappear in judicial opinions for the
following few decades:
The injustice of forcing our freed negroes on our sister
states without their consent, when we are wholly unwilling to
14.
See, e.g., Wilson v. George, 2 Del. Cas. 413, 415 (1818) (“[W]hereas it is found by
experience, that free Negroes and Mulattoes are idle and slothful, and often prove burthensome
to the neighbourhood wherein they live, and are of evil example to slaves . . . .” (quoting 1 Del.
Laws 214 (1787))); State v. Emmons, 2 N.J.L. 10, 12 (1806) (“The act of 1713-14 recites that it
is found by experience that free negroes are an idle slothful people, and prove very often chargeable to the place where they are . . . .”).
15.

Fisher’s Negroes, 14 Tenn. at 125.

16.

Id.

17.

Id.

18.

Id.

19.

Id. at 123.

20.

Id.

21.

Id. at 121.

22.

Id. at 132.

23.

Id. at 129.
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be afflicted with them ourselves, is so plain and direct a violation of moral duty as to inhibit this court from taking such a
step. . . . Would it not be treating the non-slaveholding states
unjustly to force our freed negroes upon them without their
consent? [A]nd would it not be treating the slaveholding states
cruelly? We are ejecting this description of population, fearing
it will excite rebellion among the slaves; or that the slaves will
be rendered immoral to a degree of depravity inconsistent with
the safety and interest of the White population. These are fearful evils. But are they not more threatening to Virginia (just
recovering from the fright of a negro rebellion), to the Carolinas, to Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana than to us?
Compared with the Whites, most of them have two slaves to
our one; some of them almost ten to our one. Even Kentucky
has a higher proportion than Tennessee. How can we then, as
honest men, thrust our freed negroes on our neighbors of the
south?
Suppose the non-slaveholding states northwest of the
Ohio were willing to receive our freed negroes (a supposition,
by the way, wholly untrue), would it be good policy in us to
locate them on our borders, beside our great rivers, forming
wretched free negro colonies in constant intercourse with our
slaves? . . . That such a population, inhabiting a country near us,
would become a most dangerous receptacle to our runaway
slaves, and a grievous affliction to the state where situated, as
well as to ourselves, need only be stated to gain universal admission. The time would soon come when the attempt to seize on
the harbored slaves would produce war with such a people, and
serious collisions with the state within whose jurisdiction they
resided. This it is our interest to avoid.
. . . [T]he black man is degraded by his color, and sinks into
vice and worthlessness from want of motive to virtuous and
elevated conduct. The black man in [free] states may have the
power of volition. He may go and come when it pleaseth him,
without a domestic master to control the actions of his person;
but to be politically free, to be the peer and equal of the White
man, to enjoy the offices, trusts, and privileges our institutions
confer on the White man, is hopeless now and ever. . . . He is a
reproach and a byword with the slave himself, who taunts his
fellow slave by telling him “he is as worthless as a free negro.” . . . The free black man lives amongst us without motive
and without hope. He seeks no avocation, is surrounded with
necessities, is sunk in degradation; crime can sink him no
deeper, and he commits it of course. . . . In the non-slaveholding states the people are less accustomed to the squalid and dis-
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gusting wretchedness of the negro, have less sympathy for
him . . . . Nothing can be more untrue than that the free negro
is more respectable as a member of society in the non-slaveholding than the slaveholding states. In each he is a degraded
outcast, and his fancied freedom a delusion.24
At least one case explicitly adopted Justice Catron’s pronouncements
on the dangers of free Blacks.25 And Fisher’s Negroes’s influence is plainly
evident in numerous opinions by slave state high courts:
• “The conviction upon the public mind is settled and unalterable as to the evil necessarily attendant upon this class of
population . . . —a class of people who are neither freemen
nor slaves, their presence at all times deleterious and often
dangerous to the public welfare.”26
• “[F]ree negroes are vicious and dangerous . . . . The spirit
and policy of the law aim at a restriction of emancipation,
merely for the purpose of preventing the mischief of a free
negro population.”27
• “It was, indeed, early found in this State, as in most of the
others, in which there is slavery, that the third class of free
negroes was burdensome as a charge on the community,
and, from its general characteristics of idleness and dishonesty, a common nuisance.”28
• “The act of 1843 was not retaliatory, but a measure of selfdefence, declaring that while this State will not be infested
with the free negroes of other States, we will tolerate the
evils resulting from the emancipation of our own
slaves . . . .”29

24.
Id. at 129–31.
25.
See Willis v. Jolliffee, 32 S.C. Eq. (11 Rich. Eq.) 447, 455–56 (1860) (“The evils of
colonies of free negroes, near our borders, are well stated in Fisher’s [N]egroes vs. Dobbs.”).
Several cases cite Fisher’s Negroes v. Dabbs (or Dobbs), for its authoritativeness on the propriety of
manumissions. Although these opinions lack Justice Catron’s rhetorical flourish, the jurists citing
the case likely shared Justice Catron’s views.
26.
Bryan’s Heirs v. Dennis, 4 Fla. 445, 454 (1852).
27.
Ross v. Vertner, 6 Miss. (5 Howard) 305, 347–48 (1840).
28.
Cox v. Williams, 39 N.C. (4 Ired. Eq.) 15, 17 (1845).
29.
Campbell v. Campbell, 13 Ark. 513, 521–22 (1853).
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Free state courts and legislatures also expressed similar views. In State
v. Hoppess,30 Judge Reed31 presided over the adjudication of whether a
slave who escaped from a boat on the Ohio side of the Ohio River was a
fugitive within the meaning of the United States Constitution and the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793. After expressing his deep regret that slavery
existed,32 Judge Reed concluded that such an escapee was a fugitive subject to those laws. He also acknowledged that attempts to reconcile slavery
with the Bible were a “moral insanity, a breaking up, as it were, of the
faculties to perceive or distinguish moral truth.”33 But Judge Reed did not
exhort the state to recognize free Blacks as equals. Instead he espoused a
tempered version of Justice Catron’s rhetoric:
The question is, if free what will you do with [Blacks?]
No one scarcely would wish to confer upon [them] equal political rights, and none certainly would wish for social equality
and the amalgamation of the races. So, if all were free, the presence of the negro among our people is a vast evil.
....
It is to be furthermore observed that ours is a government
of white men. That our liberties were achieved, and our government formed by white men and for white men. The negro
was not included or represented—the hope then was as it now
is—that the whole race of negroes should at some future time
be removed to a country of their own, to be subject to their
own government and laws.34
The concern with an influx of free Blacks may have been especially acute
in slave and border states, but the belief that free Blacks were problematic
stretched far beyond the Mason-Dixon line.
In 1833, the Connecticut legislature passed a law against establishing
“any school, academy, or literary institution, for the instruction or education of coloured persons” who were not Connecticut residents.35 That
same year, the state prosecuted Prudence Campbell under this law.36
30.
State v. Hoppess, 2 W.L.J. 279 (Ohio 1848). Although this case does not appear in
the Ohio reporter, Salmon P. Chase, one of the lawyers for the runaway slave, sent it to the
Western Law Journal for publication.
31.
In Hoppess, the Judge is referred to as Read. The correct spelling appears to be Reed.
See ELLIOT HOWARD GILKEY, THE OHIO HUNDRED YEAR BOOK 470–71 (1901) (noting that
Nathaniel C. Reed served on the Ohio Supreme Court from 1842 to 1849, when he resigned).
32.

Hoppess, 2 W.L.J. at 286.

33.

Id.

34.

Id. at 286–87.

35.

1833 Conn. Pub. Acts. 425–26.

36.
Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 339, 369 (1834). Crandall was acquitted on a technicality.
Id. at 369–71. The indictment omitted the fact that the school was unlicensed. Id.
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Referencing the act’s preamble, the court noted that the act’s objective
was “to prevent injurious consequences resulting from the increase of the
coloured population.”37 Neither the preamble nor the opinion elaborated
on the “injurious consequences” the legislators sought to avoid. But the
desire to limit the growth of the free Blacks indicates that the Connecticut
legislators did not view the state’s existing Black population as a desirable
group. Outlawing the education of non-resident free Blacks likely served
two purposes. First, it made Connecticut a less attractive option to free
Blacks seeking to emigrate from other states. Second, it placed those free
Blacks who chose to immigrate to Connecticut at a competitive disadvantage. Because they lacked the opportunity to obtain formal education or
instruction, this law ensured that newly immigrated free Blacks were at the
bottom rung of the economy.
Prejudices against free Blacks persisted as the country expanded westward. In Oregon, free Blacks were personae non gratae. In 1844, Oregon’s
legislative body passed a bill that subjected any free Black over the age of
18 who failed to leave the state within two years to “not less than twenty
nor more than thirty-nine stripes.”38 The provision was later amended to
replace the whipping with forced labor followed by removal from the
territory.39
These opinions and acts make it clear that slave states and free states
regarded free Blacks as an “evil” to be avoided.40 The intensity of these
beliefs varied from state to state, but they formed the backdrop against
which states passed all manner of laws concerning free Blacks, including
tax legislation.
II. THE TAXATION

OF

FREE BLACKS

The primary purpose of taxation is to raise public revenue.41 In this
regard, the tax policies of slave and free states differed little from those of
most governments throughout history.42 For general, revenue-raising pur37.
Id. at 367.
38.
Quintard Taylor, Slaves and Free Men: Blacks in the Oregon Country, 1840-1860, 83
OR. HIST. Q. 153, 155–56 (1982).
39.
Id.
40.
Not all free state courts held that belief. See Judge Davis’s Op., 44 Me. 576, 593-94
(1857) (lambasting the Supreme Court’s Dred Scott decision as coming from an unintelligent,
prejudiced mind). On the heels of the Dred Scott decision, Maine’s Supreme Court declared that
free Black males were citizens to the same extent as free White male citizens. Op. of the Supreme Judicial Court, 44 Me. 507 (1857).
41.
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1594 (9th ed. 2009) (defining tax as “[a] charge, usu.
monetary, imposed by the government on persons, entities, transactions, or property to yield
public revenue.”); see also Herbert E. Newman, Objectives of Taxation, 25 DEL. NOTES 1, 1–2
(1953), http://udspace.udel.edu/bitstream/handle/19716/4616/article1.pdf (noting that “the
revenue objective” is a commonly offered rationale for the why governments levy taxes).
42.
See, e.g., ARK. CONST. of 1836, Revenue, § 1 (“All revenue shall be raised by taxation, to be fixed by law.”).
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poses, states often made no distinction between the races when taxing personal and real property.43 And in some states, the taxable holdings of free
Blacks were quite substantial.44 This section compares and contrasts the
ways states taxed free Blacks.
A. Taxing Freedom: Slave States’ Taxation of Free Blacks
A few slave states—usually those further north—exempted free
Blacks from paying certain taxes. For example, a few Maryland counties
exempted free Blacks from paying school taxes for schools their children
could not attend,45 and North Carolina exempted free Blacks in the entire
state from paying any school tax.46 Tennessee’s 1834 constitution exempted “[a]ll free men of color” from paying the poll tax.47 But the slave
states’ overarching tax policies shared a common, non-revenue generating
theme: They used a “freedom tax”48 to discourage the growth of their free
Black populations.
Because the contours and complexities of each state’s system of taxation varied, this freedom tax took many forms. Sometimes it appeared
through the application of facially race-neutral tax laws.49 On other occasions, the states took a more direct approach by subjecting free Blacks to
43.
See, e.g., James Martin Wright, The Free Negro in Maryland 1634-1860, 97 STUDS. IN
HIST., ECON. & PUB. L. 515/125 (1921) (“Property holders in Maryland without distinction as
to color contributed to the ordinary public revenues.”); Slavery and the Colored People in Delaware,
THE COLORED AMERICAN (New York), Aug. 12, 1837 (“The real and personal estate of people
of color is assessed and subjected to taxation as according to valuation the same as any other[.]”)
(available through accessible.com). A few state constitutions from this period contain provisions
to the effect that all species of property shall be taxed equally for general revenue purposes, so in
those states, the constitutionality of varying general taxes based on the race of a property owner is
questionable.
44.
See e.g., CARTER G. WOODSON, FREE NEGRO HEADS OF FAMILIES TOGETHER
WITH A BRIEF TREATMENT OF THE FREE NEGRO xxxviii (1925) (“The Negroes of Philadelphia had taxable property to the amount of $350,000 in 1832, $359,626 worth in 1837, and
$400,000 worth in 1847.”). Free Blacks also had substantial amounts of taxable property in New
Orleans, Louisiana and Charleston, South Carolina.
45.
E.g., 1838 Md. Laws 314, ch. 327, § 10 (“[A]ll tax . . . shall be levied on all the
assessable property in said district, . . . excepting nevertheless, the property assessed to and actually owned by free negroes.”); 1834 Md. Laws 2022, ch. 263, § 1 (“[T]he trustees . . . shall have
power to levy upon all the taxable property in said districts, except the property of free persons
of color, a sum not exceeding one hundred and fifty dollars for [school purposes.]”). These laws
pertained to Kent and Montgomery counties, respectively. But not all counties created such tax
exemptions. See WOODSON, supra note 44, at xxxii (“The Negroes in Baltimore paid $500 in
school taxes in 1859, although their children could not attend the city schools.”).
46.
JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, FREE NEGRO IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1790–1860 104
(1943).
47.
TENN. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1834).
48.
The phrase “freedom tax” does not appear in the literature I have found discussing
free Blacks and taxation, but I cannot think of a more apt phrase to describe what is happening
here. Blacks could have their freedom, provided they paid actual taxes in various incarnations.
49.
See infra notes 51–62 and accompanying text.
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different taxes than their White counterparts.50 But the freedom tax was a
fact of life for free Blacks in every slave state.
Maryland v. Dorsey51 provides an absurd example of how a facially
race-neutral tax—Maryland’s first inheritance tax—constituted a freedom
tax. Around 1847, Nicholas Worthington manumitted his slaves through
his will.52 Maryland’s inheritance tax required the executor of an estate to
pay a 2.5 percent tax on the value of the estate before distributing it to the
legatees.53 But here, the legatees were themselves the estate. Maryland
sued the executor of Worthington’s estate for 2.5 percent of the slaves’
appraised value, and the lower court held that “gift of freedom to the negroes in question, is not liable to the tax.”54
The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision after summarily reiterating slaves’ firm status as property under Maryland law:
It is therefore our opinion that the manumission, or bequest of freedom to a slave by last will and testament, confers on
such slave the identical rights, interests and benefits, which
would pass, if the testator had bequeathed the same slave to
another person, and that such bequest to another would be a
legacy. The conclusion, therefore, that a bequest of freedom to
a slave is a legacy, is as clear as that things which are equal to the
same thing, are equal to one another.55
The court’s characterization of slaves as property and persons in almost the
same breath is jarring, but it bore no legal significance.56
The aftermath of this ruling is unknown. The law required the executor to pay 2.5 percent of the slaves’ appraised value—around $400—to
the State within thirteen months or risk losing his commission.57 It is unlikely that the executor simply paid the amount—today’s equivalent of
about $10,000—out of the goodness of his heart. It is much more plausible

50.

See infra notes 63–70 and accompanying text.

51.

Maryland v. Dorsey, 6 Gill 388 (1848).

52.

Id. at 388.

53.

1860 Md. Laws 581, art. 81, §§ 125-26.

54.
Dorsey, 6 Gill at 389 (quoting the lower court opinion) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
55.

Id. at 390–91.

56.
The Maryland Court of Appeals later clarified that the “identical rights, interests and
benefits” language applied only to the property interest in the value of the slaves and did not
elevate freed slaves to the status of free Whites. Spencer v. Negro Dennis, 8 Gill 314, 320–21
(1849).
57.

1860 Md. Laws 581, art. 81, § 127.
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that the executor hired out the slaves58 or sold one or two of them of them
to raise the required tax.59 Regardless, the court literally taxed freedom.
The Maryland Court of Appeals again held that a manumitted slave
was subject to an inheritance tax on his freedom in Spencer v. Negro Dennis.60 Instead of simply citing Dorsey as controlling precedent, it expounded on the soundness of its holding:
But is there, in point of fact, any injustice or hardship in
this tax? [O]r, have manumitted slaves any right to complain of
it? We think not. . . . [The State] has imposed a tax of two and
a half per cent. on legacies, and we regard the bequest of freedom to a slave, as a legacy equal to the amount of his appraised
value. If such a bequest be not a legacy, what is it? It would
puzzle the most astute and learned lawyer to find any other
head, in a legal nomenclature, under which it could be classed.
It was declared to be a legacy by Chancellor Bland, in [Hammond v. Hammond, 2 Bland 306, 314]. “That every devise and
every bequest, including the emancipation of slaves, for the gift
of freedom to a slave, is a most precious, specific legacy, are
specific legacies.” That distinguished jurist, the late William
Pinkney, in his celebrated speech before the General Assembly
of Maryland, in 1789, in favor of testamentary emancipation,
spoke of manumission as a “specific legacy.” And this court
have so treated it in the case of [Cornish v. Wilson, 6 Gill 299
(Md. 1848)].
Of what special injustice or hardships had the manumitted
slavery in the case of [Dorsey], a right to complain? They had
accepted of a bequest, charged with a small and reasonable incumbrance, which ought to be discharged, and they are amply
reimbursed for its imposition, by the increased value of their
labor resulting from the incumbrance.
The acts of Assembly of Maryland, authorising the manumission of slaves, were not passed . . . to confer benefits upon
slaves, and promote their comforts and happiness; because all
58.
It was common practice for slave owners to hire out their slaves. JENNY BOURNE
WAHL & CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS, THE BONDSMAN’S BURDEN: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
THE COMMON LAW OF SOUTHERN SLAVERY 204 (2002). In addition, there is at least one
reported instance where a master “provided in his will that his slaves be allowed to work to meet
the debts of the estate, after which they could chose freedom in Liberia or remain slaves in
Virginia.” PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE
OF JEFFERSON 279 (2014) (citing Elder v. Elder’s Ex’or, 31 Va. (4 Leigh) 252 (1833)). Therefore,
it is not beyond the pale to think that this practice could carry over into paying certain taxes.
59.
See 1860 Md. Laws 581, art. 81, § 126 (“[E]very executor shall have power, under
the order of the Orphans’ Court, to sell if necessary so much of said property as will enable him
to pay said tax.”).
60.

Spencer v. Negro Dennis, 8 Gill 314, 317 (Md. 1849).
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observation and experience, in Maryland, had demonstrated,
that the reverse would be the result; that slaves, for the most
part, were far better fed and clothed; more contented and
happy; and in point of sobriety, virtue and moral character, far
above the free coloured population of the State. But the design
of these enactments was to gratify the masters of slaves, to enlarge their privileges, and to give them an authority to dispose
of their slaves, in a way which otherwise they did not possess.61
Dorsey and Spenser appear to be the only two published cases addressing this issue, and sometime between 1849 and 1860, Maryland’s inheritance tax was amended to include the words “this not to apply to negroes
manumitted by deed or will.”62 But this was not the only incarnation of a
freedom tax in the slave states.
Some municipalities in slave states imposed taxes on free Blacks that
they did not impose on Whites. For example, St. Augustine, Florida imposed a $3 tax on all free Black males and a $1.50 tax on all free Black
females who stayed in the city for a period of two weeks or longer.63 Some
states imposed special free Black taxes. Virginia, for instance, imposed a
special tax on free Blacks to raise funds to transplant them to Liberia as
soon as practicably possible.64 In addition to taxing freedom, this tax actively sought to fund the forced removal of free Blacks from the state.
The poll tax was the most direct freedom tax slave states imposed.
Because of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment and Voting Rights Act, the
poll tax has been relegated to discussions about voter suppression. But poll
taxes need not be tied to the act of voting. Poll taxes—also known as a
head and capitation taxes—are simply “fixed tax[es] levied on each person
within a jurisdiction.”65 Poll taxes were a flat income tax of sorts—if you
61.
Id. at 317–19. It is interesting to note what the court omitted from its opinion in
Spencer. It paraphrases Hammond v. Hammond for the proposition that the emancipation of slaves
is a legacy, no different than any other bequest. Chancellor Bland went on to say that other
beneficiaries of a will “might be compelled to contribute toward the satisfaction of the testator’s
debts to the whole amount of the property given to them, before the donations to the wife and
freed slaves . . . could be at all molested.” He then stated that if the testator’s intention is “unequivocally clear,” it does not “leave room for the smallest doubt upon the subject.” Hammond
v. Hammond, 2 Bland 306, 314 (Md. High Ct. Ch. 1830).
62.

1860 Md. Laws 581, art. 81, § 124.

63.
Dorothy B. Porter, Library Sources for the Study of Negro Life and History, 5 J. NEGRO
EDUC. 232, 235 (1936) (citing David Y. Thomas, Report upon the Historic Buildings, Monuments,
and Local Archives of St. Augustine, Florida, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL
ASSOCIATION FOR THE YEAR 1905 347 (1906)).
64.
1849 Va. Acts 8 (“[A]n annual tax of one dollar shall be and the same is hereby levied
upon every free male negro of the age of twenty-one years and under fifty-five years . . . . The
fund arising from this source shall be applied to the removal of free negroes from this commonwealth [to Africa].”).
65.

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1596 (9th ed. 2009) (defining poll tax).
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resided in the state, county, or municipality that imposed the tax, you had
to pay it.
Some states imposed poll taxes on their inhabitants in a race-neutral
manner.66 But well before the Fourteenth Amendment rendered the practice unconstitutional, slave states routinely levied poll taxes on their inhabitants in an unequal manner based on race. For example, Alabama’s 1852
poll tax established the following rates:
• “On every white male inhabitant between the ages of
twenty-one and forty-five years; fifty cents.
• “On every male free negro between twenty-one and fifty
years of age; two dollars.
• “On every female free negro between twenty-one and
forty-five years of age; one dollar.”67
And Mississippi levied similar poll taxes:
• “A poll tax of forty cents on each free white male person,
between the ages of twenty-one and fifty years.
• “A poll tax of one dollar on every free, colored male person,
between the ages of twenty-one and fifty years.”68
To add insult to injury, some free Blacks who failed to pay taxes became
quasi-slaves through states’ debt collection schemes.69
66.
See, e.g., 1846 Ark. Acts 857 (levying “on each free male over the age of twenty-one
years and under sixty, a poll tax, not exceeding one dollar”).
67.
1852 Ala. Acts 130, § 391. Note that the laws make no mention of free White females. Alabama’s earlier poll taxes maintained the same 1:4 ratio for poll taxes on free White
males versus free Black males, levied a poll tax on slaves, and made no mention of free women of
either race. 1836 Ala. Acts 650 (An Act to raise a revenue for the support of government, until
otherwise altered by law. Jan. 10, 1835 (§ 3)) (“for each [slave] over ten and under sixty, twentyeight cents; for all free male negroes and mulattoes, over twenty-one years, fifty cents each; for all
free white males above the age of twenty-one years, and not exceeding forty-five, twelve and a
half cents each”). By 1852, Alabama and many other slave states had moved to an ad valorem
system of taxation for their slaves. See generally DONALD C. BUTTS, A CHALLENGE TO PLANTER
RULE: THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE AD VALOREM TAXATION OF SLAVES IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1858-1862 (1978) (discussing dynamics of the poll tax and the ad valorem tax).
68.
1857 Miss. Laws 73; see also 1823 Miss. Laws 285 (“the sum of seventy-five cents shall
be assessed and collected on each slave; the sum of seventy-five cents on every free White male,
above the age of twenty-one and under fifty years; the sum of three dollars on each and every free
man of color, over the age of twenty-one and under fifty years”) (emphasis added).
69.
See, e.g., Cooper v. Mayor of Savannah, 4 Ga. 68 (1848) (noting that the state may not
jail Blacks for failure to pay taxes but may hire them out for the amount that is due); State v.
Davis, 52 N.C. (7 Jones) 52, 52 (1859) (“[A]ll free negroes, who have not paid their taxes, shall
be made to work on the streets two days for each and every dollar of tax due the town by
them . . . .” (quoting a Newbern, N.C. ordinance)); State v. Graham, 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 457,
457 (1834) (noting that the law authorized the state “to seize and sell [free Blacks who refused to
pay their taxes] for a term of time sufficient to satisfy [the debt] not exceeding one year”); JOHN
CODMAN HURD, 2 THE LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 8 (Boston,
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B. Separate But (Mostly) Equal: Free States’ Taxation of Free Blacks
In the free Mid-Atlantic States and New England (with the exception of Connecticut and Rhode Island), all inhabitants were equal in terms
of taxation. In those states, free Whites and Blacks paid the same property
taxes,70 poll taxes,71 and special taxes.72 The same was true in Minnesota,
Wisconsin, and Michigan.73
Only a few free states subjected free Blacks to different taxes than
their White counterparts. Indiana, while it was still a territory, levied an
annual poll tax of three dollars on free Black males between the ages of
twenty-one and fifty-five.74 But Indiana, like Tennessee, exempted free
Blacks from paying the poll tax that served as a voting prerequisite.75
The California and Oregon legislatures also passed systems of discriminatory taxation. California’s 1862 passage of “An Act To Protect Free
Little, Brown & Co. 1862) (noting that Virginia passed a law in 1820 making it lawful to hire out
“negroes and mulattoes” who did not pay their taxes); see also Wright, supra note 43 (“It was held
that many free negroes [in Maryland] paid no taxes . . . and that it was but reasonable that they
should contribute to repairing the public roads.”).
70.
Free Blacks appear on the tax rolls of each of these states. See, e.g., CITY OF BOSTON,
A REPORT OF THE RECORD COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF BOSTON, CONTAINING THE
STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES’ DIRECT TAX OF 1798, AS ASSESSED ON BOSTON; AND
THE NAMES OF THE INHABITANTS OF BOSTON IN 1790, AS COLLECTED FOR THE FIRST NATIONAL CENSUS 121 (1910) (“Joseph Almsly and Thomas Freeman, owners; Joseph Almsly and
Thomas Freeman, Negro, occupiers; brick dwelling; Fronting on a passage way; East on Richardson; Northerly & Westerly on J. Kirkwood; South on Charter Street. Land, 420 square feet;
house, 420 square feet; 2 stories, 10 windows; Value, $750.”). I have not been able to find an
indication on the tax rolls or a mention in any judicial opinion or newspaper to suggest that their
general taxation differed from that of their White counterparts.
71.
See, e.g., 1840 Me. Laws 94 (making no mention of race with regard to paying a poll
tax); see also Op. of the Supreme Judicial Court, 44 Me. 507, 515 (1857) (stating that Maine’s
constitution did “not discriminate between the different races of people which constitute the
inhabitants of [Maine]”).
72.
Unlike some slave states and several other free states, it appears as though free Blacks
contributed to the payment of school taxes even though their children could not attend the
schools. See, e.g., MARY FRANCES BERRY & JOHN W. BLASSINGAME, LONG MEMORY: THE
BLACK EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA 46 (1982) (noting the story of Robert Purvis, a free Black in
Philadelphia who refused to pay school taxes for schools his offspring could not attend).
73.
This is not too surprising, considering Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Michigan had
fewer than 300, 1,200, and 3,000 free Black inhabitants in 1860, respectively. See infra TABLE
VIII.
74.
1813 Ind. Territorial Laws 485. The money was used for general county revenue
purposes, with the exception of Knox County, where the funds were used for a school. Three
dollars was also the amount set by the Indiana legislature for many criminal fines and penalties.
See, e.g., 1816 Ind. Acts 95 (fining individuals who gambled no less than three and no more than
twenty dollars); 1816 Ind. Acts 37 (fining individuals between one and three dollars for breaching the peace).
75.
See 1816 Ind. Acts 128 (levying a fifty-cent “poll tax on every actual citizen qualified
to vote”); see also 1825 Ind. Acts 23 (levying a “fifty cents poll tax on each white male inhabitant” of Marion, Hamilton, and Allen counties for county purposes).
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White Labor against competition with Chinese Coolie Labor, and to discourage the Immigration of the Chinese into the State of California”76
charged Chinese laborers—and those who hired them—exorbitant
monthly taxes.77 California’s “Anti-Coolie Act” was short lived,78 but it
served as the inspiration for Oregon’s discriminatory poll tax79:
Be it enacted by the legislative assembly of the state of Oregon, That
each and every negro, Chinaman, kanaka and mulatto, residing
within the limits of this state, shall pay an annual poll tax of five
dollars, for the use of the county in which such negro, Chinaman, kanaka and mulatto may reside.80
Taking a cue from slave states, the sheriff could force individuals who did
not pay these taxes to work on the highways to pay the taxes.81 This law
was not repealed until Oregon ratified the Fourteenth Amendment in
1866.82 Oregon’s disdain for free Blacks was well known,83 but the influx
of Chinese and Hawaiian labor competition most likely formed the primary impetus for this tax; only 128 free Blacks resided in Oregon in
1860.84
Several free states exempted free Blacks from the payment of school
taxes. Ohio, the free state with the largest Black population outside of
New England and the Mid-Atlantic, initially gave free Blacks a partial exemption from the school tax. Counties in Ohio could not levy taxes on
free Blacks for the general schools, but they could levy taxes on free Blacks
if the trustees decided to use it towards the education of free Blacks.85 Two
years later, Ohio repealed this act and simply exempted free Blacks from
76.
1862 Cal. Stat. 462.
77.
See Lin Sing v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 534, 564 (1862) (noting that the monthly charges
were two dollars and fifty cents).
78.
The act passed in April of 1862 and was pronounced unconstitutional in the same
year. Id. at 581–82.
79.
Compare 1862 Cal. Stat. 462 (describing the receipt of payment to be used), with 1862
Or. Laws 76–77 (same).
80.
1862 Or. Laws 76.
81.
Id. at 77.
82.
HUBERT HOWE BANCROFT & FRANCES FULLER VICTOR, 2 HISTORY OF OREGON
666 (San Francisco, The Hist. Co. 1888).
83.
See Crafting the Oregon Constitution: Blacks in Oregon Meet Hostility, OREGON STATE
ARCHIVES, http://arcweb.sos.state.or.us/pages/exhibits/1857/before/slavery.htm (last visited
Jan. 31, 2015).
84.
See infra TABLE VIII.
85.
STEPHEN MIDDLETON, THE BLACK LAWS IN THE OLD NORTHWEST 34 (1993)
(“[N]othing in this act contained shall be so construed as to compel . . . [blacks or mulattoes] to
pay any tax for the support of such schools; but all taxes assessed on their property, for school
purposes, . . . shall be appropriated . . . for the education of said black and mulatto persons
therein, and for no other purpose whatever.”) (quoting “An act to provide for the support and
better regulation of common schools,” Feb. 10, 1829, Laws of Ohio)).
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paying a school tax.86 This remained the law until 1847, when Ohio established schools for Black children.87 In 1847, Illinois made special provisions to return the school taxes taken from free Blacks.88 And in 1851,
Iowa exempted all of the property belonging to free Blacks “from taxation
for school purposes.”89 Indiana exempted free Blacks from paying school
taxes in 1853.90 Kansas did not exempt free Blacks from paying school
taxes, but it specified that any taxes collected from free Blacks should be
used to educate the children of free Blacks.91
Rhode Island and Connecticut were the only states to completely
exempt the property of free Blacks from taxation.92 Rhode Island’s free
Black tax exemption was short-lived.93 Because it lasted only two years, it
does not appear to have generated any published cases.
Copp v. Town of Norwich94 appears to be the only other reported case
besides Johnson v. Town of Norwich95 that involved Connecticut’s tax exemption. In Copp, the plaintiff, a White male, held land in trust for three
minors who were “lighter than mulattos, and darker than whites.”96 The
court held that because the minor children did not have a present interest
in the taxable property, the plaintiff could not claim the “free persons of
color tax exemption” on their behalf.97 It declined to adjudicate whether
the children qualified as “persons of color, within the meaning of the statute,”98 because it was unnecessary to answer that question to solve the
issue before the court. But when presented with the question five years
later, the court held that anyone with a “distinct, visible admixture of African blood”99 qualified as a person of color within the meaning of the
statute.
86.
Id. at 35 (quoting “An act to provide for the support and better regulation of common
schools,” Mar. 10, 1831, Laws of Ohio.).
87.
Id. at 37 (quoting “An act to provide for the establishment of Common Schools for
the education of children of black and mulatto persons,” Feb. 24, 1848, Laws of Ohio).
88.
WOODSON, supra note 44, at liii–liv.
89.
IOWA CODE § 1160 (1851).
90.
WOODSON, supra note 44, at liii.
91.
1862 Kan. Sess. Laws 395–96.
92.
1841 R.I. Pub. Laws 82 (Jan. adjourned sess.) (“The real and personal estate of blacks
and other people of color not freemen of this state or of any town thereof, shall not be liable to
town or state taxes in any manner whatever.”); 1844 Conn. Pub. Acts 36–37 (“[T]he personal
and real estate of any person of color in this state shall be exempt from taxation.”).
93.
1843 R.I. Pub. Laws 44 (Jan. adjourned sess.) (repealing the tax exemption for Blacks
and other persons of color).
94.
Copp v. Town of Norwich, 24 Conn. 28 (1855).
95.
Johnson v. Town of Norwich, 29 Conn. 407 (1860).
96.
Copp, 24 Conn. at 29.
97.
Id. at 32.
98.
See id. at 29 (describing the children as one-fourth Black because their father was
White, and their mother was half Black and half White).
99.
Johnson, 29 Conn. at 408.
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III. REVOLUTIONARY ROOTS: BLACK TAX OBJECTORS
After Thomas Paine’s Common Sense, John Dickinson’s Letters from a
Farmer in Pennsylvania was the most widely read pamphlet in the period
leading up to the Revolutionary War.100 In a series of letters, Dickinson
articulated the reasons why the taxes the British imposed on the colonies
were unjust. He concluded one of those letters with the following
message:
Those who are taxed without their own consent, given by
themselves, or their representatives, are slaves. We are taxed
without our own consent, given by ourselves or our representatives. We are therefore—I speak with grief—I speak with indignation—we are slaves.101
In the period between the Revolutionary and Civil Wars, this message
resonated with free Blacks across the country and appeared in several
variations.
In 1780, a group of free Blacks from Massachusetts petitioned the
state’s House of Representatives to be exempt from paying poll and property taxes. They mentioned several reasons why such an exemption would
be expedient, but a strong undercurrent of “no taxation without representation” ran throughout the petition:
The petition of several poor negroes and mulattoes, who are
inhabitants of the town of Dartmouth, humbly showeth:
That we being chiefly of the African extract, and by reason of long bondage and hard slavery, we have been deprived of
enjoying the profits of our labor or the advantage of inheriting
estates from our parents, as our neighbors the whit people do,
having some of us not long enjoyed our own freedom; yet of
late, contrary to the invariable custom and practice of the country, we
have been, and now are, taxed both in our polls and that small pittance
of estate which, through much hard labor and industry, we have
got together to sustain ourselves and families withall. We apprehend it, therefore, to be hard usage, and will doubtless (if continued) reduce us to a state of beggary, whereby we shall
become a burthen to others, if not timely prevented by the interposition of your justice and power.
Your petitioners further show, that we apprehend ourselves to be aggrieved, in that, while we are not allowed the privi100.
Pierre Marambaud, Dickinson’s “Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania” as Political Discourse: Ideology, Imagery, and Rhetoric, 12 EARLY AMERICAN LITERATURE 63, 63 (1977).
101.
JOHN DICKINSON, LETTER VII, LETTERS FROM A FARMER, IN PENNSYLVANIA, TO
THE INHABITANTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES 74–77 (Philadelphia printed, London reprinted
for J. Almon 1774).
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lege of freemen of the State, having no vote or influence in the election
of those that tax us, yet many of our color (as is well known) have
cheerfully entered the field of battle in the defence of the common cause, and that (as we conceive) against a similar exertion
of power (in regard to taxation) too well known to need a recital in this place.
We most humble request, therefore, that you would take
our unhappy case into your serious consideration, and, in your
wisdom and power, grant us relief from taxation, while under our
present depressed circumstances . . . .102
This petition was unsuccessful—the House of Representatives took no action to exempt either the petitioners or free Blacks as a class from taxation.103 But Massachusetts’s first constitution, adopted later that same year,
did not use race as a voting qualification.104
In 1815, a group of property-owning free Blacks filed a similar petition with Connecticut’s general assembly.105 Like the Massachusetts petitioners, these men did not ask for the right to vote. Instead, they sought a
tax exemption, again appealing to the revolutionary mantra of “no taxation without representation.”106 Additional groups of Connecticut free
Blacks filed similar petitions,107 and the state finally exempted the property
of free persons of color from taxation in 1844.108
These petitions did not enjoy unanimous support within the Black
community. The Colored American, a New York newspaper run by free
Blacks, ran an editorial criticizing Rhode Island’s Blacks for their successful petition to be relieved of taxation if the state would not extend the
right to vote to them.109 The editorial characterized the move as “bad
102.
Petition of John Cuffe, et. al (Feb. 10, 1780) (reprinted in GEORGE WASHINGTON
WILLIAMS, HISTORY OF THE NEGRO RACE IN AMERICA FROM 1619 TO 1880: NEGROES AS
SLAVES, AS SOLDIERS, AND AS CITIZENS 126 (New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1883)) (emphasis
added).
103.

See id. at 126–27.

104.
See MASS. CONST. art. II, § 2 (1780) (granting suffrage to “every male inhabitant of
twenty-one years of age and upwards” who fulfilled certain property ownership requirements).
105.
See Petition by Bias Stanley and William Lanson, New Haven-dwelling, property
owning, “men of color,” to the Conn. Gen. Assemb. (October 1815); see also infra note 107.
106.
See JAMES M. ROSE & ALICE EICHHOLZ, BLACK GENESIS: A RESOURCE BOOK
AFRICAN AMERICAN HISTORY 87 (2d ed. 2003) (briefly describing the petition).

FOR

107.
These petitions are available on micro-film through the Connecticut State Library,
but I was not able to obtain them through the Inter-Library Loan program. Instead I relied on
the library’s descriptions of the petitions. See Research Guide to African-American Genealogical
Resources at the Connecticut State Library, CONN. ST. LIB., https://web.archive.org/web/
20130408144014/http://www.cslib.org/blagen.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2015).
108.

See 1844 Conn. Pub. Acts, supra note 92.

109.
The Colored People of Rhode Island, THE COLORED AMERICAN (New York, N.Y.),
Mar. 27, 1841.
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policy, calculated most successfully to defeat their objective” of obtaining
suffrage.110 It expressed the view that exempting Blacks from taxation provided Whites “with a pretence to withhold . . . the elective franchise.”111
The paper feared that Whites would make the following argument:
“[W]hy, we have released them from taxation as an offset, at their request;
what more do they want? They ought to be satisfied.”112
Adopting The Colored American’s policy position, Pennsylvania’s free
Blacks did not place a tax exemption option on the table. Instead, “no
taxation without representation” became an atmospheric element used to
tie their struggle for suffrage to the Revolutionary War.113 Ohio’s free
Blacks sounded a similar note in their resolutions for equal rights.114
And in a slightly more activist variant, some advocated the civil disobedience of withholding taxes until states granted free Blacks the right to
vote. The abolitionist Charles Lennox Remond was perhaps the most
prominent of these figures.115 A few individuals actually adopted his suggestion. In 1857, for example, some Black businessmen in California refused to pay poll taxes so long as they were unable to vote:
During a residence of seven years in California, we, with
hundreds of other colored men, have cheerfully paid city, State
and county taxes on real estate and merchandise, as well as licenses to carry on business, and every other species of tax that
has been levied from time to time for the support of the government, save only the ‘poll-tax’—that we have persistently re110.

Id.

111.

Id.

112.

Id.

113.
See, e.g., Liberty Movements: Convention in Bradford County, Pa., THE NATIONAL ERA
(Washington, D.C.), Sep. 30, 1847 (“Resolved, That the fifty thousand citizens of Pennsylvania,
who are disfranchised by the odious white clause in our State Constitution, are living witnesses
of the cruel prejudice, injustice, and imbecility of Pennsylvania; and, until she permits them to
exercise the elective franchise, she dishonors the memory of the ‘illustrious dead’ of our country,
who sealed with their blood the doctrine, that taxation and representation should go together.”);
Suffrage, THE NORTH STAR (Rochester, New York), Dec. 8, 1848 (“Taxation, without representation, was the exact fact by which ‘Britain’s King lost States thirteen;’ and the principle that
‘all governments derive their JUST powers from the CONSENT of the governed,’ was the very
fulcrum of the revolutionary lever which overthrew the tyranny of the past ages. Can the DEMOCRACY of Pennsylvania any longer sin against its own soul?” (reprinted from the PHILADELPHIA REPUBLIC)).
114.
See Meeting of Colored Citizens, THE N. STAR (Rochester, New York), Jan. 12, 1849
(“Whereas we believe with the ‘Fathers of 76,’ that taxation and representation ought to go
together—Resolved, That we very much doubt about paying any tax upon which representation
is based, until we are permitted to be represented.”).
115.
See SPEAK OUT IN THUNDER TONES: LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS BY BLACK
NORTHERNERS, 1787-1865 109 (Dorothy Sterling ed. 1973) (“Let every colored man called
upon to pay taxes to an institution in which he is denied its privileges, withhold his taxes, though
it cost [him] imprisonment.”).
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fused. On the day before yesterday, the Tax Collector called on
us, and seized and lugged off twenty or thirty dollars’ worth of
goods, in payment, as he said, of this tax.
Now, while we cannot understand how a “white” man
can refuse to pay each and every tax for the support of government, under which he enjoys every privilege—from the right
to rob a negro up to that of being Governor of the State—we
can perceive and feel the flagrant injustice of compelling
“colored men” to pay a special tax for the enjoyment of a special privilege, and then break their heads if they attempt to exercise it. We believe that every voter should pay poll-tax, or
every male resident who has the privilege of becoming a voter;
but regard it as low and despicable, the very quitescense of
meanness, to compel colored men to pay it, situated as they are
politically. However, if there is no redress, the great State of
California may come around annually, and rob us of twenty or
thirty dollars’ worth of goods, as we will never willingly pay
three dollars as poll-tax as long as we remain disfranchised,
oath-denied, outlawed colored Americans.116
Even seventy-five years after the revolution, the spirit behind John
Dickinson’s words encouraged free Blacks to challenge what they saw as
very similar injustices to those imposed by the British during colonial
times.
IV. UNDERSTANDING

THE

STATES’ VARYING TAXATION SCHEMES

What accounted for the proliferation of discriminatory taxes? Why
did many states exempt free Blacks from paying school taxes and some poll
taxes? How did free Blacks in Rhode Island and Connecticut succeed in
their bids to secure tax exemptions or suffrage while the pleas of those in
other states fell on deaf ears? One can explain the variance between how
the states treated free Blacks for taxation purposes by using a combination
of napkin-and-pen economics, geography, demographics, and history.
A. Taxing Free Blacks to Protect Slave Assets
If, to paraphrase Justice Catron, free Blacks were idle, incapable of
earning a living, and threatened to become a burden on the state, why
charge them higher poll taxes? Why not tax them the same rates as Whites
or exempt them from paying taxes altogether? Because slave states never
intended these taxes to be revenue generating. These taxes were economic
116.
Lester & Gibbs, Letter to the Editor, THE LIBERATOR, July 3, 1857, reprinted in SPEAK
OUT IN THUNDER TONES, supra note 115, at 120-21.
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deterrents to the growth of the size and wealth of the free Black
population.117
For slave states, deciding whether to impose freedom taxes was not a
difficult task. Slaveholdings represented vast amounts of wealth.118 And according to popular belief, free Blacks posed a threat to slavery as an institution.119 In addition, economically handicapping free Blacks fed the
popular narrative that slaves—with masters who fed them, clothed them,
housed them, and paid taxes on them—led better lives than free Blacks
who struggled to obtain those necessities.120 And in a purely economic
sense, this was likely true throughout many of the slaveholding states for
the average laborer. A free Black would need a substantial amount of
wealth to pay the extra taxes and still live a comfortable life.121 Under these
circumstances, the only way for a free “person of color” to escape discriminatory taxes was to leave the state, return to slavery,122 or pass as White or
some acceptable non-Black race.123 To the average slave state legislator,
any of these options would have been more desirable than an increase in
the free Black population’s wealth.
117.
See WOODSON, supra note 44, at xxxii (“Virginia made further discrimination in capitation taxes in 1813 when it laid a special poll tax of one dollar and fifty cents on all free Negroes
above sixteen years of age when not bound out as apprentices. The idea here was not so much to
increase the revenue of the [s]tate as it was to get rid of this class of population.”); George Ruble
Woolfolk, Taxes and Slavery in the Ante Bellum South, 26 J. S. HIST. 180, 188 (1960) (“The
relatively small number of free Negroes in the Southern population makes clear that regulation
rather than revenue was the chief purpose.”); cf. Leiper v. Hoffman, 26 Miss. (4 Cushm.) 615,
616 (1853) (“[T]here . . . [was] a great spirit . . . to remove from the [s]tate all free persons of
color.”).
118.
By some estimates, slaves represented as much as forty-four percent of all wealth in
parts of the South. Roger Ransom & Richard Sutch, Capitalists Without Capital: The Burden of
Slavery and the Impact of Emancipation, 62 AGRIC. HIST. 133, 138–39 (1988).
119.

See supra Part I.

120.

See supra Part I and the discussion in Spencer v. Negro Dennis, 8 Gill 314 (Md. 1849).

121.
Indeed, there are several instances of free Blacks, especially women, petitioning the
government to repeal or exempt them from onerous taxes. See, e.g., Race, Slavery, and Free
Blacks: Series I, Petitions to Southern Legislatures, 1777–1867, http://cisupa.proquest.com/
ksc_assets/catalog/1543.pdf at 117, 164.
122.
There are several instances of free Blacks petitioning slave state legislative bodies to
voluntarily enter into slavery. See, e.g., Petition of Joe Bird (1859) (asking to be “elevate[d] . . .
from his present condition [of freedom] into slavery”). This petition and several others are
available through ProQuest at http://cisupa.proquest.com/ksc_assets/catalog/1543.pdf.
123.
In states like South Carolina, several individuals challenged being subject to the payment of poll taxes on account of interesting racial histories. See, e.g., Johnson v. Basquere, 28
S.C.L. (1 Speers) 329, 330 (1843) (noting that some individuals “were not subject to be taxed as
free persons of African origin, but that they were exempt from such a tax, as the descendants of
Egyptians”). It is unlikely that these individuals were actually descendants from Egyptians, instead
inventing the story to avoid being a “person of color” within the meaning of the law. For more
discussion on this issue, see Daniel J. Sharfstein, Crossing the Color Line: Racial Migration and the
One-Drop Rule, 1600-1860, 91 MINN. L. REV. 592 (2007).
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The taxes did not succeed in completely ridding the slave states of
the “grievous affliction” of free Blacks, but they helped slow their growth
and, in the case of Mississippi, reduce their ranks.124
B. A Delicate Balancing Act: The Varying Taxation of Free
Blacks in Free States
Free states did not necessarily share the slave states’ vested interest in
maintaining the institution of slavery. But free states’ views on free Blacks
differed from their slave state peers’ only in the timbre of their rhetoric.
Free-state legislators and jurists believed free Blacks would corrupt the
morals and the economies of their states. In general, free states used taxes,
in concert with disenfranchisement, bonds,125 and general threats126 to
perform a delicate balancing act.
Unlike the slave states, free states had a greater interest in preventing
destitution among their free Black populations than maintaining the allure
of slavery. Free states did not want to force free Blacks into a position
where they would become drains on the government or social liabilities
out of necessity. They gained little from making the lives of free Blacks
unbearable. This likely accounts for the overwhelming absence of blatantly
discriminatory taxes in most free states. California and Oregon are the exceptions, and their discriminatory taxes were primarily directed at the
Chinese, not free Blacks.
At the same time, free states did not want to make themselves attractive destinations for free Black immigration. In essence, these competing
motivations would encourage states to pursue policies that allowed free
Blacks to survive, not thrive. This may explain, in part, the reticence of all
but two of the free states to extend general tax exemptions to free Blacks.
C. Understanding the Free Black Tax Exemptions
Between the Revolutionary and Civil Wars, the states extended two
types of tax exemptions to free Blacks: (1) specific tax exemptions for voting-related poll taxes and school taxes and (2) general tax exemptions for
all personal and real property. Specific tax exemptions were found in slave
124.
See infra TABLES I–VIII (enumerating the number of free blacks in each state). But cf.
WOODSON, supra note 44, at xxxii (“[T]he records show that the Negroes generally met this
obligation and thereby made it impossible for any large number to suffer the penalty of being
reduced to a state of servitude.”).
125.
Illinois and a handful of other states required free Blacks entering the state to post
bonds to protect against becoming wards of those states. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 220–21 (2010) (noting bond requirements in Illinois and
Cincinnati).
126.
See Oregon’s short-lived “lash law,” which threatened free Blacks who did not leave
the state with up to thirty-nine lashes reoccurring every six months. Crafting the Oregon Constitution: Blacks in Oregon Meet Hostility, OREGON STATE ARCHIVES, http://arcweb.sos.state.or.us/
pages/exhibits/1857/before/slavery.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2015).
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and free states,127 while the general exemptions were limited to Connecticut and Rhode Island.128
School and voting-related poll tax exemptions were likely acceptable
because the taxes were collected for specific, narrowly defined purposes.
The Indiana and Tennessee poll taxes were voting prerequisites,129 and the
school taxes were used exclusively for the development and maintenance
of educational institutions.130 Legislators and laypeople would have understood social mores to preclude free Blacks from voting and Black children
from attending white schools. And although the unfairness of these social
conventions was lost on the vast majority of the lawmaking population
during this time period, the unfairness of charging an individual a tax for
something that he, by law, has absolutely no possibility of enjoying may
have been more difficult to overlook.
By contrast, the Rhode Island and Connecticut free Black tax exemptions were likely due, in large part, to economics, history, and geography. Both of these states had free Black populations of around three
percent when their legislatures passed the tax exemptions.131 A cursory
analysis suggests that these states would not have lost a substantial amount
in revenue,132 but that their populations were potentially large enough to
create an unwelcome social disturbance if their grievances were not addressed. Neither was located especially close to a slave state, allaying fears
of readily attracting downtrodden free Blacks. And finally, the republican
theme of “no taxation without representation” appears to have resonated
with the states’ legislators, perhaps because they were part of the original
colonies.133

127.
See supra Part II. Maryland, North Carolina, and Tennessee exempted free Blacks from
certain taxes. It is not surprising that no Deep South states exempted free Blacks from specific
taxation, as they had the largest vested interest in maintaining the superior status of the slave, and
any tax exemption necessarily made the lives of free Blacks easier.
128.

See supra notes 92–99 and accompanying text.

129.

See supra notes 47 & 75 and accompanying text.

130.

See supra notes 85–91 and accompanying text.

131.

See infra TABLE VI.

132.
An analysis of 1860 Maryland’s free Black taxpayers shows that they accounted for
approximately twelve percent of the population but held less than 0.5 percent of the total assessed
property in the state, accounting for about three percent of what a normal distribution would
expect. Wright, supra note 43, at 580/190. Even if we assume that free Blacks in Rhode Island
and Connecticut were four times as wealthy as those in Maryland, their impact on tax revenue
would have had a similar effect.
133.
At the dawn of the Civil War, free Blacks could vote in New York, Massachusetts,
Rhode Island, Vermont, Maine, and New Hampshire. These were the only states where free
Blacks could vote, and it is not difficult to attribute this fact to their participation in the Revolutionary War.
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CONCLUSION
Taxes are primarily tools to raise revenue, but they also play a role in
effecting social policies. Both free states and slave states used taxes and tax
exemptions as tools to affect the lives of free Blacks.
Why didn’t more states offer general tax exemptions? In slave states,
the answer is easy: To encourage and support a free Black population in
any manner would have been viewed as economic suicide. Tax exemptions
would have effectively increased free Blacks’ wealth, strengthening this undesirable population.
In the few free states that extended the franchise to free Blacks, exempting their property from taxation would have severed the implied connection between the right to vote and payment of taxes that resonated
with many in the young country.134 In the remaining free states, economics ruled out tax exemptions as an unobjectionable policy choice. By 1850,
the free Black populations in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and New Jersey were
too sizeable to write off the revenue the states generated from their
taxes.135 And by 1860, the free Black populations in California, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, and Oregon had not
yet achieved the critical mass necessary for those states’ respective legislatures to seriously consider protestations of “no taxation without
representation.”136
Whether providing free Blacks with tax exemptions would have been
sound economic policy for more states is less clear-cut. Answering this
question would require aggregating substantial amounts of data on tax collections from free Blacks and tax expenditures on the same group. Considering the fact that only one in seventy-three free Blacks owned taxable
property in one study,137 it is not difficult to imagine a situation where a
state’s tax revenue would have been less than its expenditures, and exempting free Blacks from property taxes would have offset the state’s costs. But
economics does not always drive policy decision, and given the political
climate, the optics of such an exemption may have been difficult for even
the most affable legislator to overcome.
This Essay provides a small window into the subject, which is ripe for
more research.138 The information gleaned from these studies provides additional context for understanding the period between the Revolutionary
134.
See supra notes 100–01 and accompanying text.
135.
See infra TABLE VII.
136.
See infra TABLE VIII.
137.
See Wright, supra note 43, at 582/192 (discussing the tax payments of free negroes in
Baltimore).
138.
Locating primary source documents regarding manumitted slaves who were subjected
to inheritance taxes on their freedom or conducting an in-depth analysis of the cause and effects
of Connecticut’s tax exemption for persons of color are two potentially article-worthy topics.
And because so much taxation occurred at the city and county level, aggregating those tax lists
could provide data for more detailed economic analysis.
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and Civil Wars. It will hopefully never have direct applicability to contemporary events, but it can provide some insight into the debates surrounding
current and future tax policies and the extent to which history, prejudice,
and economic concerns may combine to shape policymakers’ decisions.139
“History doesn’t repeat itself, but it rhymes.”140
TABLES
I. POPULATION DATA

FROM THE

Ȁ Ǥ  

1790 CENSUS

Ǥ



  

ͷǡ͵͵Ͳ

ͻͷͳ

ʹͷͳǡͲͲʹ



ǡͳͷ͵

ͺǡʹͺ

Ͷǡʹ͵



ͳǡͻͳͻ

ͷͻǡͻͻ

ͳʹǡͺ

 

Ͷͳ

ͶͲǡ͵Ͷ͵

ʹʹͲǡͻͷͷ



ͺͳͺ

Ͳ

ͳͷͳǡͳͻ

ͳͻǡͷͺ

ͳͲͷǡ͵ͷ

͵ͶͳǡͷͶ͵

ǡͶͷʹ

Ͳ

ͶʹʹǡͺͶͷ

ͺͷʹ

ͺ

ͳͺ͵ǡͺͷͺ

ͶǡͶͲʹ

ͳʹǡͶʹʹ

ʹͳͳǡͳͶͻ

ͳͲǡ͵Ͷ

ʹͲǡͳ͵

ͷͺǡͳͺʹ

ǡͲ͵

ͳ͵͵ǡʹͻ

ͶͺǡͳͲ͵



ͳͶǡͷͶ

ͳǡͲ

Ͳʹǡ͵ͷ

 

͵ǡ͵ͲͶ

͵ͺͲ

ͻǡͳʹʹ



͵ǡͳͺͷ

ͳͶǡͳͷͳ

͵Ͷͷǡͷͻͳ



͵Ͳͻ

ͳ͵ǡͷͺͶ

ͳͲͷǡͲʹ



ͷͷ

Ͳ

ͳͷͶǡͶͷ

ʹͲǡͶͻ͵

͵Ͷǡͳ

ͺͺͷǡͳͳ


 
 
 





139.
For example, during the 2012 presidential campaign, President Barack Obama’s message of making the wealthy “pay their fair share” struck a chord with the populist campaign for
the ad valorem taxation of slavery in North Carolina during the period leading up to the Civil
War. Compare David Jackson, Obama: Millionaires should pay ‘fair share,’ USA Today, Apr. 11,
2012, http:/content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2012/04/obama-live-on-thebuffett-rule/1#.UMTbR5PjnXN, with DONALD C. BUTTS, A CHALLENGE TO PLANTER RULE:
THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE AD VALOREM TAXATION OF SLAVES IN NORTH CAROLINA:
1858–1862 (1978).
140.
This quote is often attributed to Mark Twain. Eugene Volokh, History Doesn’t Repeat
Itself, But It Rhymes, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 18, 2005, 1:51 PM), http://
www.volokh.com/posts/1108756279.html.
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Ǥ





ʹǡʹͷ

͵ͶʹǡͺͶͶ

ͳǡʹ͵



Ͳͺ

ͶǡͳͲͲ

ʹͲͻǡͺͻ



ͻʹ

Ͳ

ͻʹǡͷͻ

ǡͻ͵

Ͳ

͵Ͳǡͻʹ

ͳͺǡͲ͵

ʹǡʹͻͲ

ͻͳǡͷ͵ʹ



ͻ͵ʹ

͵ͻǡ͵ͳͲ

ͺǡͶͶͷ



ʹǡͻ͵ͳ

͵ͺͳǡͺʹ

ͻͲǡͳͺͷ



ͷǡͶ͵

Ͳ

ͺͷͳǡͶͲ



ͳͳǡʹʹ

Ͳ

ͻͺͺǡͶͳ

͵͵͵

Ͳ

ͳͻʹǡʹͳͶ

 

ͳͲǡͲͳͳ

ʹͳͲǡͻͺͳ

ͻͺʹǡͶͲͷ



ͳǡͶʹ

ʹͶͶǡͺͲͻ

ͷͳǡʹ

ͳǡ͵ͷ

Ͳ

ͷͺ͵ǡͳͻ

Ͷǡʹ͵

ͻͲǡ͵ͺ

ͷͺ͵ǡͲ͵Ͷ

 

ͻǡͲͶ

Ͳ

ͻͻͶǡͷͳͶ

 

ʹǡͷͺ͵

Ͳ

͵ͻǡͷͶ



͵ͻ

Ͳ

ǡͲ



ͻ͵Ͳ

͵Ͳͻǡͺͺ

Ͳǡͷʹ

ʹǡͳͺ

ͺǡͶʹʹ

ͺʹǡͲͶͶ

ͷʹͲ

Ͳ

͵ͳǡͻ

 

ʹ͵ǡͺͳͲ

ʹ͵

Ͷͺͻǡͷͷͷ



ͶͻǡͲͻ

Ͳ

͵ǡͲͻǡ͵ͻͶ



ʹǡͶ͵

ʹͺͺǡͷͶͺ

ͺͻǡͲ͵ͻ



ʹͷǡʹͻ

Ͳ

ͳǡͻͺͲǡ͵ʹͻ



ͷ͵ǡʹ

Ͳ

ʹǡ͵ͳͳǡͺ

 

͵ǡͲ

Ͳ

ͳͶǡͷͶͷ



ͺǡͻͲ

͵ͺͶǡͻͺͶ

ͺǡͷͲ



ǡͶʹʹ

ʹ͵ͻǡͶͷͻ

ͳǡͲͲʹǡͳ



͵ͻ

ͷͺǡͳͳ

ʹͳʹǡͷͻʹ



ͳͺ

Ͳ

͵ͳͶǡ͵ͲͶ

ͷͶǡ͵͵͵

Ͷʹǡͷʹͺ

ͳǡͶʹͳǡͳ

͵ͷ

Ͳ

͵Ͳͷǡ͵ͻͳ
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ʹǡͻͲ

Ͷ͵ͷǡͲͺͲ

ͻͶǡʹͲͳ



ͳͶͶ

ͳͳͳǡͳͳͷ

Ͷ͵ͷǡͶͷͲ



ͶǡͲͺ

Ͳ

͵ͻǡͻͻͶ

  

ͺǡʹ

Ͳ

ͶͲǡͳͶ

ͳͻǡͺʹͻ

ͳǡͻͺ

ͳͳʹǡʹͳ



ͻ͵ʹ

ͳǡͶͷ

ͳͶͲǡͶʹͶ



͵ǡͷͲͲ

Ͷʹǡͳͻͺ

ͳǡͲͷǡʹͺ



ǡʹͺ

Ͳ

ͳǡͳͳǡͻͷͳ



ͳͳǡͶʹͺ

Ͳ

ͳǡ͵ͷͲǡͶʹͺ

ͳǡͲͻ

Ͳ

Ͷǡͻͳ͵

ʹͷ

ʹ

ͳͲǡʹͲ

 

ͳͲǡͺͶ

ʹʹͷǡͶͺ͵

ͳǡͳͷͷǡͺͶ



ͳͺǡͶ

͵͵ͳǡʹ

ͲͺǡͲͲʹ

ͳǡ͵ʹ

Ͳ

ʹͺǡʹͻ

ͺ͵ǡͻͶʹ

ͺǡͳͺͻ

ͺǡͲͶͻ

 

ͻǡͲʹ

Ͳ

ͳǡʹ͵ͳǡͲ

 

ǡͻͻ

Ͳ

Ͷͻǡͳͳ͵



ʹͷͻ

Ͳ

ͳʹǡͲʹ͵



͵

Ͷ͵ǡ͵ͳ

ͻͳǡ͵Ͳͷ











͵ǡͷʹ

ͳͳͶǡͻ͵ͳ

ͳǡͳͺʹǡͲͳʹ





ͳͷ

ʹͺǡͺͶͳ



Ͷͷ

Ͳ

ǡͺͷ

ͶͻͶ

Ͳ

͵ʹǡͲ͵

 

ʹͷǡ͵ͳͺ

ͳͺ

ʹǡͲ͵ͷ



ͶͻǡͲͲͷ

Ͳ

͵ǡͺͺͲǡ͵ͷ



͵ͲǡͶ͵

͵͵ͳǡͲͷͻ

ͻͻʹǡʹʹ



͵ǡ͵

Ͳ

ʹǡ͵͵ͻǡͷͳͳ

ͳʹͺ

Ͳ

ͷʹǡͶͷ



ͷǡͻͶͻ

Ͳ

ʹǡͻͲǡʹͳͷ

 

͵ǡͻͷʹ

Ͳ

ͳͶǡʹͲ



ͻǡͻͳͶ

ͶͲʹǡͶͲ

Ͳ͵ǡͲͺ
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ǡ͵ͲͲ

ʹͷǡͳͻ

ͳǡͳͲͻǡͺͲͳ



͵ͷͷ

ͳͺʹǡͷ

ͲͶǡʹͳͷ



Ͳͻ

Ͳ

͵ͳͷǡͲͻͺ

ͷͺǡͲͶʹ

ͶͻͲǡͺͷ

ͳǡͷͻǡ͵ͳͺ

ͳǡͳͳ

Ͳ

ͷǡͺͺͳ


 

